Plans to “Update” international sanctions on Yemen reveal preparations for the next round in the Red Sea arena
Dherar Al-Tayyib – Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni:
The Red Sea arena remains open to various escalation possibilities, not limited only to the naval blockade that the Yemeni Armed Forces have vowed to reimpose on the Israeli enemy should the Gaza ceasefire collapse. Rather, indicators are increasing of ongoing preparations aimed at attempting to restore the control lost by the US and its partners in the Red Sea, in light of plans and proposals centered around the idea of involving regional and local parties to achieve several objectives simultaneously.
Recently, a message sent by the new Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Major General Youssef Al-Madani, to the Al-Qassam Brigades was revealed, stating, “We are closely monitoring developments and declare that if the enemy resumes its aggression on Gaza, we will return to our military operations deep in the Zionist entity, and we will re-impose the ban on Israeli navigation in the Red and the Arabian Seas.”
The shipping sector, eager for stability, viewed this message as the first official Yemeni announcement of the cessation of naval military operations as long as the ceasefire in Gaza continues. This has sparked significant debate within the shipping and maritime security industry about the current level of risk in the waterway. But what concerns us here is that the message cements the new reality of the Red Sea as an arena permanently linked to developments in Gaza and the associated rounds of escalation—something the Israeli enemy and its partners have come to understand well, and even the shipping sector itself.
When the British company “Ambrey” recently adjusted its risk assessments for the Red Sea in light of increased navigation traffic in the Bab Al-Mandeb, it confirmed that risks were decreasing but only for some companies, indicating that the shipping lane would always carry serious risks for ships linked to Israel as long as the conflict persists.
This new reality remains a recognized strategic problem for the enemy front, especially after the failure of two American campaigns with British participation and European defensive support to restore the previous balance of naval control. And since all conflict parties are openly preparing for additional rounds of confrontation, the Red Sea undoubtedly constitutes a main arena in the view of planners for the next round. While Sana’a solidifies the equations of the naval blockade with clarity, the planners of the other parties are dealing with a clear need for new equations and methods to overcome the results of the abysmal failure recorded by aircraft carriers, warships, and bombers during the past round.
Ahead of the UN Security Council session on renewing the sanctions regime on Yemen, held mid-month, Britain (which handles the Yemen file in the Council) submitted a draft including updates to the sanctions regime under Resolution 2140 issued in 2014, to meet the new needs of the enemy front. The maritime arena occupied the largest and most important part of these updates. The draft included provisions for wide-scale inspection measures for ships heading to Hudaydah ports in Yemeni territorial waters and throughout the region, either through the local militias affiliated with the Saudi-Emirati coalition or through multinational naval partnerships in cooperation with these militias, in addition to imposing restrictions on the import of “dual-use” goods and other measures under allegations of the “Ansar Allah” movement’s relationship with African organizations and organizations.
These updates came at the behest of the US, which had repeatedly called in previous Security Council sessions to expand the activity of the UN inspection mechanism concerned with verifying shipments heading to Hudaydah ports, in exchange for demanding the cancellation of the work of the Hudaydah Agreement monitoring mission, which never supported the claims of the US and its partners regarding the smuggling of weapons and drugs to the free Yemeni ports.
Reports indicate that the British-American updates to the sanctions regime faced strong opposition from Russia, China, and African countries. Therefore, a modified formula was settled upon, involving the extension of the original sanctions regime, with the addition of a condemnation of the Red Sea attacks, a call for member states to tighten the arms embargo, and a request for recommendations and proposals via the Panel of Experts regarding “improving information sharing on suspected vessels” and “dual-use” imports. This is a formula that the Russian Deputy Permanent Representative considered to be “effectively paving the way for tightening the sanctions regime on Yemen in the future,” which is why Russia abstained from voting.
While the Chinese mission clearly affirmed that the updates added “suddenly” by Britain are measures that are “unclear in their criteria, not subject to any oversight in their implementation, and are highly arbitrary… and will severely affect freedom of navigation and maritime transport, and even the normal international trading system, and violate the rights of states to conduct international trade in accordance with international law,” it considered that the modified formula that was approved “still makes promoting the imposition of a naval embargo the ultimate goal.” China—which also abstained—warned that the recommendations requested by the draft resolution might later contribute to escalating tensions.
Although the US expressed annoyance at what it described as “missing the opportunity” to explicitly tighten the siege on Yemen, it indeed confirmed its intentions to exploit the resolution’s formula to impose naval blockade measures in the future. The US Deputy Representative emphasized the importance of the awaited recommendations regarding “controlling the flow of dual-use goods” and “improving the naval embargo,” which highlights the extent of Washington’s influence on Security Council committees and experts.
In any case, the American-British inclination towards these measures clearly reflects the strategy that the enemy front is working on for dealing with the Red Sea arena in the next phase, as the move in the Security Council is very clearly linked to previous preparations, which included the (Yemeni Maritime Security Partnership) conference hosted by Saudi Arabia in partnership with America and Britain last September, which aims to support the “Coast Guard” militias affiliated with the Saudi-Emirati coalition for what the US Embassy described at the time as “confronting Houthi activities”—a more explicit expression than the titles “combating smuggling” and “enhancing maritime monitoring,” and directly points to the Yemeni operations supporting Gaza. The conference included the provision of financial and logistical support from Saudi Arabia and Britain, which Al-Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi considered a clear attempt to protect Israeli navigation and hinder Yemeni support.
Over the past period, the US, Saudi Arabia, and local militias participated in an intensive effort to cement propaganda about “smuggling weapons and drugs from Iran” into Yemeni territorial waters through repeated announcements of the seizure of smuggled shipments and widely promoting this.
It is noteworthy that many Western and Israeli research centers have been busy in the past period preparing proposals and plans for dealing with the Yemeni front after the American, Israeli, and European failure. The issue of supporting local and regional forces for deployment in territorial waters, igniting fronts, and “imposing strict naval blockade zones” around the free ports was among the most prominent points these proposals agreed upon.
In meetings with an Israeli team that visited the southern governorates, senior leaders of the local militias, including their minister of defense, pledged to “secure the Red Sea” in exchange for obtaining external military and financial support, including the equipment allegedly seized at sea in the past period!
Of course, the plan being worked on by the enemy front is not related to combating the alleged “smuggling.” Netanyahu himself admitted that the Yemeni Armed Forces possess an independent capability to produce ballistic missiles and various weapons, and the Americans and Israelis have spoken extensively about the impact of Sana’a’s independence on the repeated failed attempts to “destroy” Yemeni capabilities.
The plan aims to decouple the link between the Red Sea and Gaza through a battle with international, regional, and local dimensions and titles far removed from the “genocide” of the Palestinians and its repercussions and to transform the pressure imposed on the enemy’s ports and supply chains due to the aggression on Gaza into pressure on the main lifeline of the Yemenis by detaining and preventing cargo and fuel ships from reaching the majority of the population. Additionally, of course, it aims to address the problem of attrition and the significant risks suffered by the Americans and British in the sea battle by involving local and regional forces to achieve great momentum and increase the area of operational flexibility and sustainability (theoretically), especially if the plan also includes utilizing the network of bases and airports built by the UAE in the past period on Yemeni islands and some coastal governorates—something that is highly expected.
It can’t be said at all that the failure to explicitly pass measures for inspecting and intercepting ships and restricting imports through the Security Council means the plan is canceled or even frozen. Security Council resolutions often come later to legitimize aggressive moves that have already been undertaken, especially if there is something in previous resolutions that paves the way for them. Even if no resolution is passed, that would not put an end to the plans of the US and its partners, although there is a clear keenness to exploit the “margin of maneuvering” that Saudi Arabia, in particular, shelters behind.
Regardless of whether the hostile escalation at sea occurs as part of a wide campaign or gradually, it is likely not to stop at intercepting and detaining ships, because the expected repercussions, as well as the shared desire between the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to “remove the Yemeni threat,” make the ignition of fronts on land more probable, with the scope of mutual bombing operations expanding.
In any case, detaining or preventing any cargo or fuel ship heading to Hudaydah ports would constitute a noisy return to the pre-2022 truce situation, and Sana’a would need to keep pace with this dangerous escalation with its available capabilities and new equivalent equations, which would create a series of actions and reactions, forcing either a complete retreat from the hostile escalation (as happened with the decision to transfer bank centers from Sana’a) or proceeding with it and betting on its resolution, as Sana’a cannot accept any new restrictions on the flow of goods, let alone the danger of militarizing territorial waters.
While the Americans, Israelis, and local militias show a clear desire for escalation, Saudi Arabia does not show any reluctance or restraint whatsoever. On the contrary, it is conducting military preparations related to the escalation itself, as is the case with the joint naval exercise (Red Wave), and it responds to Sana’a’s demands regarding the implementation of the “roadmap” by emphasizing the “priority” of linking the peace file to addressing “regional concerns,” according to the latest discussions of the UN Envoy with the Saudi Ambassador, Mohammed Al Jaber. It seems there are bets that Mohammed bin Salman’s visit this month to the US will provide defensive and security guarantees for the Kingdom, as Trump has already hinted at the possibility of approving the sale of (F-35) fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. If this happens, it would reflect a clear Israeli intervention with main connections to the Yemen file, because the biggest obstacle to supplying the Kingdom with these fighters is Washington’s commitment to the military superiority of the Zionist enemy in the region. Therefore, allowing such a deal must exclusively serve Israeli objectives. While the Biden administration had previously proposed this deal as part of a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and the enemy entity, the matter today cannot be separated from the ideas and proposals being discussed within Israel regarding the importance of providing American guarantees and incentives to Saudi Arabia to encourage it to participate directly in dealing with the Yemeni threat.
On the opposing side, Al-Sayyed Abdul-Malik Badr Al-ddin Al-Houthi confirmed readiness to confront “the enemy and whoever gets involved with him.” Despite the extreme “restraint” practiced by Sana’a, its official discourse has indeed returned to directing implicit and direct messages to the Kingdom, whether by revealing the existence of an American-Israeli-Saudi operations room working against Yemen from within the Kingdom, and the involvement of Saudi intelligence in recruiting agents and spies who directly participated in identifying targets for American raids on Yemen, or through the statements of Sana’a’s Foreign Ministry, which warned that “the Yemeni people will not stand idly by in the face of the exacerbating humanitarian suffering,” and prior to that, the statements of the Acting Prime Minister, Mohammed Muftah, who hinted at the equation of “port for port and airport for airport” in response to “restricting the flow of goods.”
The attempt to issue an international resolution to tighten the naval siege on Yemen is not just an experiment but a new given in a broader equation already being built on the ground and on the map of the Red Sea by the US, Israel, Britain, and Saudi Arabia, down to the local militias. However, the mere existence of this move does not mean it will succeed, especially in light of the many indicators of Sana’a’s awareness of the nature of its adversaries’ positions and its declared readiness for all scenarios, including the scenario of fighting on multiple internal and external fronts.