Tehran Threatens Retribution, and Washington Seeks a Way Out of the Hormuz Predicament

Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni – Exclusive:

The confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other has entered a more complex phase following the funeral of the late Iranian Supreme Leader, the martyred Ali Khamenei, as the funeral ceremonies turned into a platform to announce that Tehran does not consider his assassination a file that can be closed within any truce or political settlement.

The speech of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, emphasized that the response is not linked to a specific official remaining in his position, and that Iran has a list of those it considers responsible for the assassination operation, in a message suggesting that retribution has become a long-term institutional commitment, not merely a threat linked to the emotions of the moment.

Washington Tries to Reframe the Conflict Narrative:

In response, Israel hurried to inform Washington, according to the prevailing narrative, that it had detected an Iranian plan to target US President Donald Trump in retaliation for the assassination of the former Supreme Leader.

Since then, Trump has intensified his talk about the threats he faces, in an attempt seemingly aimed at rebuilding domestic and international sympathy around him, presenting the confrontation as a defense of American leadership against a cross-border Iranian threat.

However, this narrative faces a clear political obstacle; the United States and Israel are the parties that initiated the aggression on Iran and targeted its supreme political and religious leadership. Therefore, it is difficult to turn any potential Iranian threat into the basis for a broad international coalition, because many countries may see what is happening as a direct extension of a war that began with an American-Israeli decision, not an Iranian aggression separate from its context.

Washington may obtain statements of solidarity, but it is uncertain that these positions will translate into military or political participation in a new confrontation, especially after the failure of previous war objectives.

The Failure of the Bet on Overthrowing Iran and Then Containing It:

The roots of the current crisis lie in the collapse of two successive American plans. The first plan was based on the assessment that Iran was like a “house of cards,” and that a quick, comprehensive strike targeting the supreme leadership, military installations, and decision-making centers would lead to the collapse of the regime and the subsequent disintegration of the regional forces linked to it. This conception, according to the American-Israeli narrative, was built on intelligence assessments that assumed the wide-scale attack that began on February 28 and ended on April 8 would be sufficient to bring about a radical transformation in the structure of the Iranian state.

But the results were contrary to these calculations. State institutions did not collapse, the military and security structure did not disintegrate; instead, the war pushed Tehran to accelerate the leadership transition, bringing in younger and more hardline figures, while expanding the discourse of deterrence and retaliation beyond the regional sphere.

Thus, the targeting of the leadership, which was supposed to create confusion in the system, became a factor that recreated it in a more robust form and increased the cost of any internal settlement with Washington.

The second plan was based on concluding a temporary truce, later called a “memorandum of understanding,” while continuing military and economic pressure.

The goal was to push Iran to accept a stricter nuclear agreement, including surprise inspections, expanding the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, access to undeclared sites, and interrogating scientists, in parallel with negotiations on missiles and regional policy.

From Tehran’s perspective, the memorandum was not a peace project, but an attempt to buy time, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and enable the United States and its allies to alleviate the energy crisis and replenish reserves, before resuming pressure or carrying out a new strike under more favorable conditions. Therefore, the chances of continuing the understanding diminished once Iran saw that Washington wanted to obtain immediate economic and security gains, without providing guarantees to prevent the renewal of war.

Hormuz.. Iran’s Most Prominent Pressure Card:

The Strait of Hormuz has now become the most sensitive center of the crisis.

Repeated American attempts to impose a navigational passage near Omani waters that bypasses Iranian control have failed, according to available data.

The problem is no longer limited to American military capability but has become linked to the confidence of shipping and energy companies in the guarantees provided by the Pentagon.

These companies calculate risks based on probabilities of loss and insurance, not political statements, and therefore several ships have preferred to stop transiting rather than rely on protection that does not guarantee preventing targeting.

Thus, Iran has regained its ability to effectively control navigation traffic by threatening to strike ships that do not coordinate their passage with it or refuse to pay the fees it imposes.

The strait may not be closed by an official decision, but it is approaching a state of “voluntary closure,” where companies avoid transit due to high risk, which gives Tehran a wide economic impact without the need to declare a complete closure.

Limited and Costly American Options:

The effectiveness of the American military threat has diminished for several reasons. First, the element of surprise is over; Iran has been in a state of mobilization and war for months, and has redistributed its forces, leadership, and facilities according to this reality.

Second, the war has not achieved its supreme objectives, whether by overthrowing the regime or dismantling its allies, and the attempt to turn the truce into a tool for gradually stripping Iranian capabilities has also failed.

The third factor is Tehran’s adoption of a long-term attrition strategy, based on preventing the adversary from achieving a decisive victory, and then attacking its economic, political, and maritime weak points.

In this context, Hormuz becomes a more effective pressure tool than direct military confrontation, because energy disruption immediately affects the American economy and global markets, placing the administration under increasing internal pressure.

Added to this is the decline in popular and political enthusiasm within the United States and Israel for the continuation of the war, given the rising economic costs and growing fears of a widening confrontation.

Furthermore, Iran’s threat to review its nuclear doctrine raises the level of risk; a return to all-out war could lead to decisions that go beyond the limits of a traditional response, a possibility that Washington realizes could change the nature of the crisis entirely.

Faced with this scene, the United States will not stop searching for alternatives to open the strait or reduce the impact of its disruption, whether through new naval arrangements, political pressures, or regional mediation.

But the failure of the proposed passage near the Sultanate of Oman narrows Trump’s room for maneuver, leaving him with two costly options: either return to a war that has not achieved its objectives, or reach an agreement that gives Iran guarantees and conditions that Washington previously refused. In both cases, Tehran today appears further from the position of a defeated party, and more capable of imposing the security of the Gulf.