How Did Southern Forces Read Al-Alimi’s Apology?
After days of popular escalation and days before his return, Rashad al-Alimi, head of the Presidential Council Authority, loyal to the coalition in southern Yemen, issued a statement that contradicted between an apology and a show.
But this political fantasy created a new division in southern circles, so how did the southern leaders, the most sophisticated, read the matter?
Days ago, Al-Alimi, the president who came from the north and among the rubble of the former regime, remained the subject of controversy in the areas under his rule in southern Yemen, after putting forward the vision of his teacher Ali Abdullah Saleh, the inferiority of the southern issue.
He was one-step away from his removal, and the southern political and military forces collapsed in an unprecedented fusion to respond on him. However, with the same tactic that former president Ali Saleh used during the past decades against the south, Al-Alimi himself succeeded in dividing the southern street, although his statement did not carry an explicit apology for what he had done, nor did he retract what he said.
In fact, Al-Alimi’s statement was governed by regional directives, as the reports say, it is just an attempt to absorb tension and pave the way for his return.
The statement included basic and important points, most notably its veiled threat to the leaders of the southern resistance factions, and its adherence to the principles of Riyadh Agreement, which stipulates the exit of STC factions and the end of its influence over Aden.
While maintaining the condition of restoring the state, and thus he refers to STC fighting in the north as a condition for forming a southern delegation.
This cleverness of the context did not fool many experienced political leaders, most notably, Abd al-Rahman al-Wali, the head of what was known as the Parliament of the South, who demanded a deep reading of the statement. He indicated that it does not deviate from the context of the ongoing war against the south since 1994.
According to the governor, the statement was deliberately extended to mislead the facts and market misleading. The marginalization of the southern issue has also been renewed, not to mention his carrying a veiled threat to the southern forces, specifically the resistance factions, and the most important thing is the description of the popular southern media as not neutral. He called the governor to beware of the statement.
Contrary to Al-Wali, media voices loyal to the transitional government began marketing the statement as an “apology,” and Al-Alimi’s compliance with the southern escalation, according to what Salah Al-Saqladi and others see, but this tone towards Al-Alimi’s step is not clear whether the transitional is trying through it to market a false victory in order to save face after the resentment against Al-Alimi, which was caused by statements about the south or a superficial reading of the statement.
Whatever the goals of the statement and the position of the southern forces are, the data confirms that Al-Alimi succeeded in silencing the escalation of the transitional council and cut off the path for him to achieve political gains. While he is preparing to pack his bags towards Aden to bring down what is left of the transitional and its factions in the view of the southern street and to break the prestige of the council, whose leaders are still thundering and threatening to hide Al-Alimi from Aden and turn into embers, he went crazy, says Abu Hammam al-Yafei.