Preparing for the next round… Yemen maintains the pressure of “Unity of the Arenas,” and Israel’s eye is on “Recruiting” the Gulf
Derar Al-Tayeb – Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni:
The strikes of Yemeni missiles and drones on the Israeli enemy entity only ceased with the ceasefire in Gaza—a condition that two major American campaigns and several rounds of direct Israeli bombing tried to remove from the equation before reaching any agreement in Gaza, but to no avail. Now, with the recognition that the threat posed by Yemen persists, the Israelis are striving to devise solutions to the puzzle of the new, distant front whose capabilities they can’t “live with” and which is connected to all conflict arenas. Among all the options being discussed, there is a consensus—and not a random one—on the necessity of cooperating with regional parties, most notably Saudi Arabia.
“Unity of the Arenas”:
After having previously warned of the danger of “normalizing” the link between a ceasefire in Gaza and the cessation of Yemeni missile and air attacks, the former commander of the Israeli Air Defense, Brig. Gen. (res.) Zvika Haimovich, wrote days ago that the recent fulfillment of this condition following the latest agreement “does not negate the threat Israel witnessed over the past two years” and that “Israeli security perceptions can’t and should not remain as they were before the first missile was launched from Yemen on October 31, 2023.”
The issue is not only that the Yemeni front has imposed its main position in the enemy’s future calculations regarding Gaza, but regarding the entire broader conflict. Cementing the equation of “attribution” for Gaza is also establishing the principle “unity of arenas”, which the enemy and the US exerted great efforts to completely abort, because it makes the danger of a multi-front war erupting permanently present and exhausting. Consequently, “Israel cannot afford a situation that allows such a threat to open fire on it at any time,” in the words of Haimovich, who also added that in the absence of achieving real deterrence against Yemen, “Israel will have to continue living under a constant threat and try to maintain an immediate and organized response, both defensively and offensively.”
In this same context, Danny Citrinowicz, a former official in Israeli military intelligence and a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, believes that “even if a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas holds, Israel’s problem with the Houthis is unlikely to disappear,” pointing out that the Yemenis “might launch missiles and drones towards Israel in protest of attacks against other components of the Axis, just as they have claimed responsibility in the past for firing on Israel due to Israeli attacks on Tehran and Beirut and due to Jews entering the Al-Aqsa Mosque”!
Even before the Al-Aqsa Flood, the leadership of the Yemeni front had declared that Yemen would be part of the regional war promised by the former Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in response to any Israeli targeting of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Today, after Yemen has indeed become a solid regional front, the Israelis realize that the end of the confrontation with this front is farther than they thought, something the Yemeni leadership doesn’t hesitate to confirm by announcing its readiness for the coming rounds.
The Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper considered on Saturday that the assassination of the Yemeni Army Chief of Staff, Mohammed Abdul Karim Al-Ghamari, is a “symbolic blow” that will not affect Yemen’s military capabilities, noting that “the Houthis are no longer a primitive force,” in its words.
Thinking About “Removing the Threat”:
Last March, just two days before Israel resumed its war on Gaza, the Trump administration launched its military campaign against Yemen, aiming to preempt any intervention by the Yemeni front, which was playing the role of a ceasefire observer at the time (the Maariv newspaper later acknowledged that the headline “protecting navigation” announced by the Trump administration was aimed to keep Israel out of the scene and help recruit Arab countries into the campaign). That move was clear evidence of the scale of pressure posed by the Yemeni front remaining as an active front strongly linked to the Gaza arena.
While the chances of war returning in Gaza remain high, despite much optimism, the issue of targeting Yemen is now being discussed in Israel clearly and publicly as an independent necessity, even if the war in Gaza does not resume. In fact, the Israeli security establishment wishes to decouple the connection between the two arenas, as recent reports have clarified.
While most proposals discussed within the enemy’s entity agree on the necessity of preparing for a “sustained campaign” in Yemen, many researchers and analysts there do not place much reliance on airstrikes and even “assassinations” to achieve impactful results.
Citrinowicz says that “Israel’s strategy against Yemen can’t rely on assassinations and ‘silver bullet’ operations (a term referring to using simple solutions to deal with a very complex problem)” and that “Israel must compensate for its lack of understanding of its adversary and the absence of its presence in the Red Sea region,” warning against “exaggerated boasting of Israel’s ability to effect regime change in Sana’a.”
These conclusions are based not only on the failure of Israeli bombing campaigns against Yemen over the past two years but also on the failure of two consecutive American campaigns and the fall of other assessments long considered axioms. Citrinowicz also points out that “senior Israeli officials believed that the 12-day war against Iran would deter the Houthis, but the opposite happened.”
Therefore, Israeli analyses and proposals primarily converge on the option that the US was unable to pursue to the required extent over the past two years, which is to recruit a regional alliance to act against Yemen while mobilizing local militias in a ground operation against the Yemeni Armed Forces.
Yedioth Ahronoth says that Israel’s inability to operate on the ground in Yemen “makes the Houthis more immune,” pointing out that the failure of the plan discussed during the Trump administration’s campaign against Yemen to support a ground operation by local forces left Israel “disappointed.”
Therefore, Citrinowicz proposes “establishing an Israeli presence in the Red Sea to provide operational flexibility against Yemen, while developing an alliance with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have an interest in weakening the Houthis, and elements in southern Yemen led by groups such as the Presidential Leadership Council chaired by Rashad Al-Alimi, which aims to replace the Houthi regime.” This is essentially a brief summary of the plan that enjoys broad consensus within the enemy entity.
The Possibility of “Recruiting” Gulf States:
Israeli analysts don’t talk about exactly what guarantees the possibility of proceeding with this option, in which the US failed. While promoting the idea of persuading the US to provide “security guarantees” to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, such as pledging to defend them and supplying them with the necessary defensive and offensive weapons, there is also talk of Saudi Arabia’s “responsibility” for the escalation of the Yemeni threat to this extent, which indicates an attempt to impose the “necessity” for Riyadh to change its policy towards Yemen and complete the task of confronting Sana’a.
It is no coincidence that this coincides with attempts to portray Saudi Arabia as a main victim of Yemeni naval operations, a tactic previously used by the US to recruit Egypt into the (Prosperity Guardian) coalition, but without success.
While the former Israeli Air Defense commander admits that the task of recruiting a regional alliance is not easy and is a “lengthy process,” he points to “the possibility of the Mossad playing a key role in creating the conditions for such a move” and the possibility of starting by “training opposition forces,” as he describes it.
In truth, although the obstacles that prevented the US from pursuing the (regional-local) option as desired still exist, including the fears of Saudi Arabia and the UAE of being exposed to Yemeni strikes, the stance of the Gulf states is theoretically susceptible to change.
Israeli reports have recently indicated that the partnership between the enemy and the Gulf states, particularly the UAE, “played a decisive role” in enhancing the Israeli intelligence and operational presence against Yemen.
Saudi Arabia has deliberately linked the fate of the peace agreement with Sana’a to the war in Gaza and the battle of the Red Sea so that this file remains a pressure card with the Americans and Israelis, even though the roadmap for a comprehensive solution was ready and officially adopted by the UN. Riyadh also practically engaged in economic escalation against banks operating in areas under the control of the Yemeni government in Sana’a before direct threats of bombing forced it to retreat. Nevertheless, it continued to provide various forms of support to the American fleet in the Red Sea during the campaign against Yemen and recently hosted and supported what was called the “Yemeni Maritime Security Partnership” conference, which Sana’a said aims to guard Israeli ships, as well as hosts and operates early warning and radar systems and shares radar data that helps intercept Yemeni missiles and drones heading towards Israel.
Accordingly, it can’t be said that Saudi Arabia is, in principle, opposed to being recruited into an alliance that involves working with Israel and mobilizing local proxies against Sana’a. However, it seems to be looking for circumstances or “formats” of participation that suit its own desires and aspirations, which keeps the appetites of the Israelis and Americans open for working on this option and dragging Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states into it.
Nevertheless, just as it was proven wrong for Israeli officials to believe that targeting Iran would deter Yemen, no one can actually guarantee that forming this alliance will decide the confrontation, especially since the leadership of the Yemeni front has already proven its readiness to fight a multi-front battle, including with Saudi Arabia if necessary.