What is the fate of the “de-escalation” between Sana’a and Riyadh?
Derar Al-Tayeb – Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni:
The file of the conflict between Sana’a and the Saudi-Emirati coalition has recently returned to the forefront due to a mix of official statements and growing popular discontent, which is pressuring to end the state of “no peace, no war” that has frozen the situation for over three years. This has caused the continuation and expansion of humanitarian and economic suffering and kept the door open for American and Israeli military, security, and political moves that have further complicated the scene and made it too sensitive to continue oscillating between a peace that one party does not want and a war that another party does not currently favor, at least for now.
From a “Truce” to a Pressure Card:
The terms of the “truce” agreement signed in April 2022 were far too modest to write a real end to the war, but they were supposed to prepare for a negotiation track leading ultimately to a comprehensive solution by addressing the humanitarian file first. However, the results fell even below the modest expectations, as Saudi Arabia targeted the “truce” itself. It was not content with merely procrastinating on some terms, rejecting others, violating the ceasefire, and fabricating new conditions; it also attempted to bypass the humanitarian file and turn the negotiations into an endless debate while allowing its loyal militias to take center stage as a “main party” in discussions about the file of prisoners, the file of roads, and even the file of Sana’a Airport, reaching the file of resources.
The truce was extended from two months to six months because achieving a ceasefire in itself was progress, and despite the negative indicators that never disappeared, Sana’a’s keenness to continue exploring the prospects for peace was not unjustified, especially in the presence of Omani mediation, which is highly valued by the Yemeni leadership and which worked—as reported—in a different manner from the approach of the United Nations, which is clearly complicit with the coalition. However, the positivity of the mediators and Sana’a’s desire were not enough to upgrade the official truce to “peace” after a full six months; instead, it deteriorated into a state of “de-escalation” that Saudi Arabia exploited to further reinforce the state of “no war, no peace.”
This shift reflected the failure of the negotiations to establish a chronic and clear formal framework for the de-escalation track. Although the state of “de-escalation” represented a normalization of the ceasefire situation and opened the door for subsequent simple understandings, such as a slight increase in flights from Sana’a Airport (to a single destination) and the easing of some restrictions on Hudaydah port, those understandings remained confined to what Al-Sayyed Abdul-Malik Badr Al-ddin Al-Houthi later described as a “margin of de-escalation that America allowed” for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in dealing with various files, pointing out that the scope of this margin in dealing with the Yemeni file was “the narrowest.”
This description, which came a full year after the signing of the truce agreement, provided a clear answer to questions that had increased during that year about the nature of the coalition’s and Saudi Arabia’s stance. Despite the talk of the head of the Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat, of “American pressures to evade peace obligations,” this was closer to a diplomatic expression of the truth of the coalition’s commitment to the American position—an expression justified by the fact that negotiations were ongoing and Sana’a was keen on their success. But in reality, what began as a truce that was supposed to lead to a Saudi-Yemeni peace had already transformed into a pressure card in the hands of the US against Yemen, making Washington the almost sole party responsible for obstructing or achieving peace, which led Saudi Arabia to see a greater opportunity to try to turn the narrative upside down and present itself as a mediator among the Yemenis, even though it is the party negotiating with Sana’a. While many viewed this as an attempt at media deception, the Saudi “narrative” was not only trying to cement the topic of the “civil war” as a description but also as a basis for dealing with the obligations of ending the war—a path that Saudi Arabia has clearly worked on since the beginning of the truce by pushing its loyal militias to the forefront in all files.
Accordingly, even the roadmap that was later reached, which was supposed to redirect the de-escalation track towards real peace, was not guaranteed, because the Saudi position contained many constantly growing gaps that could obstruct the implementation of this roadmap at any stage. Among these gaps was the linkage that became more present in the scene to “American pressures,” as well as presenting the “Al-Alimi” government as a facade for implementing the peace understandings.
This would become clearer after the outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the start of Yemen’s operations supporting Gaza. Although the signing of the roadmap had become “imminent,” according to Al-Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, the US directed that it be blocked to pressure Sana’a and linked it to backtracking on the decision to support Gaza. This obstruction highlighted the truth of Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the American position and its exploitation of the peace file with Yemen as a pressure card for Washington’s benefit. Even if some insisted on the approach that “American pressures” prevent the Saudis from proceeding with peace, Saudi positions after October 7 made it clearer that the issue is one of commitment more than one of pressure.
From Maneuvering to Escalation:
If “reneging” was the most prominent title of Saudi Arabia’s position regarding peace with Yemen before the Al-Aqsa Flood, then escalation was clearly the title of the next phase. After Riyadh had exploited the “margin of maneuvering” to buy time with simple understandings, promises, and the normalization of the cessation of Yemeni military operations, it began to exploit it to clearly target Yemen. It didn’t suffice with turning the peace file into a pressure card for the Americans but turned itself into an effective security and military base for intercepting and monitoring Yemeni attacks on Israel, supplying the US Navy in its operations against Yemen, and even proceeding with economic escalation against banks operating in the free zones and closing Sana’a Airport in mid-2024 as part of American efforts to deter the Yemeni support front for Gaza.
Al-Sayyed Abdul-Malik’s warning to return to bombing the Kingdom in response to that escalation was not only an immediate and firm accompaniment to this shift but also an important definition of the framework of the Saudi “margin of maneuvering,” which had indeed become a “margin of escalation,” by drawing strategic red lines whose sensitivity Saudi Arabia knows well. These lines would later deprive the Americans and Israelis of the ability to benefit from the Saudi commitment more effectively, such as by moving fronts inside Yemen, because that warning made Saudi Arabia face the reality that it is directly responsible for the movements of its local proxies, which undermines its strategy of dealing with the situation in Yemen as a “civil war.”
After this clash, things became clearer than ever. The situation is one of “no war, no peace,” but Saudi Arabia does not even want to remain in the middle; rather, it is looking toward a state of war—but not the war from which the 2022 truce saved it.
It is a mistake to ignore the experience of the escalation against banks in assessing the Saudi position regarding peace in Yemen. Even after Saudi Arabia backtracked and an agreement was reached to resume airport flights and operate (Sana’a-Cairo) flights and cancel the decision to transfer bank centers, Saudi Arabia refused (once again) to operate the second destination for Sana’a Airport and didn’t stop voluntarily sliding towards escalation.
Benefiting from its pre-Al-Aqsa Flood experience in buying time and keeping the peace file available for linkage to any developments within the American stance, Saudi Arabia saw the increasing Israeli momentum against Yemen as an additional opportunity, not to freeze the peace file—that was already a foregone conclusion—but to explore additional options for escalation against Yemen. In addition to providing intelligence information and attempting to target the Yemeni internal front, Riyadh moved to activate the proposals and ideas being studied by the enemy regarding mobilizing local militias in southern Yemen.
For example, although the “Yemeni Maritime Security Partnership” conference, which aims to confront Sana’a on the maritime front, could have been launched under direct American sponsorship, Saudi Arabia chose to lead the scene, not only by hosting the conference and announcing support for it with millions of dollars, but also by directly overseeing the track of rehabilitating and preparing local militias behind the facade of the “Saudi Program for the Development and Reconstruction of Yemen” and others.
It is no secret that this move is part of a broader track sponsored by the US and Israel to regain lost control over the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb behind local facades, and also directly. This includes diligent efforts to cement propaganda about “smuggling weapons and drugs into Yemen” through repeated announcements of seizing alleged Iranian shipments, which are likely in reality to be direct support for the local militias that have not hidden their demands to the Americans and Israelis for support, especially the military equipment they claim to have “seized,” in order to launch an externally supported ground campaign against the free zones, particularly Hudaydah.
Saudi Arabia recently led the news of seizing an alleged drug shipment valued at nearly one billion dollars, presenting itself as the “leader” of the joint naval forces that carried out the seizure operation in the Arabian Sea. This is another station where Riyadh insists on participating directly and publicly in the naval move to restore American control over the waterways and target Yemen under the title of “combating smuggling.”
It is no coincidence that this coincides with the UAE’s continued expansion of the network of airports and air bases it is building in Yemeni islands and coastal governorates.
What is the Next Phase?
The path of de-escalation between Sana’a and Saudi Arabia, from the truce agreement to today, has not been a path of “ups and downs” but rather a downward path in its outcome (relative to the goals that were originally supposed to be achieved from the de-escalation). The road whose “map” was agreed upon is no longer a road to peace in Saudi Arabia’s view, at least, because it has turned it into a twisted path of escalation against Yemen.
Saudi Arabia didn’t link the peace file merely to American “pressures,” but to the broader conflict in the entire region. However, it will not be up to Sana’a to wait for this conflict to be definitively resolved in order to liberate employees’ salaries from the Saudi National Bank and liberate prisoners from prisons. The path Saudi Arabia is on isn’t cautious enough, especially in light of the clear Israeli desire to escalate against Yemen in the future and the American desire to regain control over the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb. Saudi Arabia now realizes that it will be directly responsible for any move by its local militias, whether on the military or economic level.
Additionally, it can’t be certain that Sana’a has accepted the premise that nothing can be done to push Saudi Arabia towards committing to the obligations of ending the war, whether in isolation from the broader conflict or within it, especially in light of the unrelenting popular discontent. Al-Sayyed Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi recently stated that all files can be dealt with within the general position related to supporting Gaza and confronting the Israeli and American enemy.
While Saudi Arabia may resort to using some cards from the humanitarian file to maintain de-escalation when needed, such as a “partial prisoner exchange,” the likelihood of it proceeding with a real and comprehensive peace without major pressures is almost non-existent. In light of the escalation path it is gradually engaging in, the inevitable result is an explosion.
The truth is that Saudi Arabia itself doesn’t ignore this inevitability. Its fear of fully engaging in American and Israeli escalation against Yemen over the past two years was driven not only by fear of being exposed to Yemeni attacks but also by fears that the US would leave it halfway and not provide it with sufficient support. Therefore, the Israelis believe that “providing American guarantees” to Saudi Arabia would encourage it, and Saudi Arabia itself is keen to conclude major defense agreements with the US before making up its mind regarding Yemen.