The full picture: What is the situation of the Red Sea front with the start of the ceasefire in Gaza?

Derar Al-Tayeb – Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni:

The situation of the Red Sea front occupies a significant part of the scene of the ceasefire in Gaza, where the shipping sector (primarily companies subject to the ban imposed by the Yemeni Armed Forces) faces conflicting indicators regarding the possibility of returning to the Red Sea. Profit calculations and logistical arrangements further complicate the picture, and while the main question everyone seems to be asking is, “Has the war really ended?” the primary party responsible for providing this decisive answer to the shipping sector is the Israeli enemy, not Sana’a.

What is the declared Yemeni position?

According to the speech of Al-Sayyed Abdul Malik Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi last Thursday, Sana’a will “monitor” the situation in Gaza to determine the extent of Israel’s commitment to the agreement, with a declared possibility of returning to the “path of support and backing” if the enemy turns against the agreement.

The latest military statement stated that “the Armed Forces will deal in light of the results of those developments on the ground in a manner that leads to achieving the demands of the oppressed Palestinian people.”

Since the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center in Sana’a (the liaison with the shipping sector) has not yet issued any update regarding the situation in the Red Sea, it can be said that Sana’a is still waiting for more progress in the ceasefire agreement to begin gradually changing the state of naval blockade imposed on navigation linked to Israel, which is consistent with the principle of monitoring and interacting based on developments set by the leadership of the Yemeni front.

What is the expected change?

The experience of the ceasefire last January represents an important reference for any assessment of the current situation in the Red Sea or for anticipating potential updates. At that time, the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center informed shipping companies of the lifting of the ban on all ships except those wholly owned by Israeli persons or entities or those flying the Israeli flag and said that the ban on these ships would be lifted “upon the completion of all stages of the agreement.”

The principle of monitoring and interacting based on developments was a clear basis in that decision as well, and the Armed Forces fully committed to what was announced, attested by all, before the Israeli enemy resumed its war on Gaza and the American aggression on Yemen was resumed last March.

Given the similarity of circumstances, the gradual progress in the current ceasefire is likely to be reflected in the situation in the Red Sea, similarly to what was announced in January, if additional variables such as new attacks on Yemen do not occur. The January decision included a clear confirmation that if Yemen is subjected to any aggression, sanctions would be re-imposed on the aggressing countries.

What is the status of Israeli navigation?

Based on the experience of the January ceasefire, navigation traffic closely and directly linked to the Israeli enemy appears less likely to benefit from the ceasefire before the agreement is fully implemented, at the very least.

Within the enemy’s entity, they rule out that the ceasefire agreement will lead to the revitalization of operations at the Umm Al-Rashrash (Eilat) port via ships coming from the Red Sea, as reported by the Hebrew newspaper “Calcalist.”

Brigadier General (Res.) Yuval Ayalon, the former commander of the Israeli Navy Fleet and a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, said that “In the near term, some calm will prevail, except for what is happening in the Red Sea.”

In its latest weekly updates, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Information Coordination Center stated on Monday that “the threat level for any commercial ship or shipping company affiliated with Israeli interests (wholly/partially owned, flying the Israeli flag, calling at Israeli ports) remains critical when crossing the Red Sea.”

What does the international shipping sector say?

According to the British (Lloyd’s List) network, which specializes in shipping and marine insurance affairs, shipping companies need “complete conviction” before returning to the Red Sea.

The shipping giant “Maersk”—which is subject to the Yemeni ban due to its continued dealings with Israel—says it “will consider resuming transit through the Red Sea only after reaching a long-term and viable security solution,” as reported by Reuters. This is the same position announced by other companies like “MSC,” which is also subject to the Yemeni ban due to its connection to Israel.

However, the security guarantee awaited by these companies is not related to deterring the Yemeni Armed Forces and eliminating their capabilities, as some believe, but rather to the fact that the ceasefire agreement in Gaza remains fragile, which is due to the stance of the Israeli enemy more than anything else, as it was the one that decided to overthrow the January agreement and the return of war last March.

Lars Jensen, a maritime shipping consultant and founder of (Vespucci Maritime,) says that the agreement last January did not lead to the situation in the Red Sea returning to what it was before the crisis “because companies were likely concerned about the continuation of the ceasefire agreement, and also from an operational perspective, it would be very complicated to divert ships towards the Suez Canal and then quickly have to reverse course and return to sailing around Africa.”

The company “Maersk” explicitly admits that “there is a clear link between the security risks in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the conflict in Gaza.”

The fact that the Israeli enemy actually resumed the war on Gaza after the January agreement, leading to the resumption of Yemeni naval operations, makes the uncertainty that shipping companies now feel reasonable.

What are the latest escalation indicators?

Uncertainty about the end of the war in Gaza is the most prominent headline for the situation in the Red Sea. However, it is not limited to the potential explosion of the situation in the Palestinian Strip alone. Over the past few days, indicators have emerged that are difficult to ignore regarding Israeli intentions to continue attacks on Yemen.

After Channel 12 reported last week about the desire of the security establishment of the enemy entity to “separate the Yemen Square from Gaza,” Channel 14, which is close to Netanyahu, reported on Saturday, quoting the extremist Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, saying that “Israel has not finished dealing with the Houthi threat,” adding, “They have a huge infrastructure underground, and this is a major threat that must be eliminated.” DANNY CITRINOVITCH

While DANNY CITRINOVITCH, a former official in Israeli military intelligence and a researcher at the Institute for National Security in Tel Aviv, believes that “the probability of returning to full-scale fighting in Gaza is low at the moment, due to the guarantees provided by President Trump to Qatar and Turkey regarding the continuation of the ceasefire,” he simultaneously believes that the focus of the enemy’s security establishment will shift towards Iran and Yemen, noting that “Yemen still poses a major challenge, and the statements of senior Houthi officials after the ceasefire in Gaza are clear in this regard,” adding that “the genie that came out of the bottle in the Battle of the Iron Swords cannot be put back in” and that despite all Israel has done, “it has not been able to build a deterrent balance that would prevent the Houthis from firing on Israel and ships passing through the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait,” as he put it. However, he does not rule out that Israel will rely on diplomatic paths to deal with these challenges, such as “focusing on Gulf states to weaken the Houthi threat.”

Yuval Ayalon, the former commander of the Zionist Navy Fleet, says that “if the agreement encounters problems, the Houthis will remind us of their presence,” considering that “the Houthi problem remains, whether there is an agreement in Gaza or not.”

He adds, “Israel must continue to gather relevant intelligence and build a target bank,” but he believes that “in the end, Israel alone will not be able to solve the Houthi problem.”

These indicators, which have been increasing since the announcement of the ceasefire, regarding the “need” of the enemy to deal with the Yemeni front, cannot be ignored in assessments of the Red Sea situation. Because any new Israeli aggression on Yemen, and any new regional or international mobilization in the sea, could lead to the renewal or escalation of sanctions on ships and companies linked to Israel and any other parties participating in targeting Yemen.

What is the status of American ships?

So far, the ceasefire agreement between Sana’a and the US appears to be holding. Although the sanctions recently imposed by Sana’a on American oil industry giants in response to the Trump administration’s sanctions against Yemen raised questions about the potential return of targeting ships linked to the sanctioned companies, the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center has never mentioned this.

In its assessment of this situation, the Combined Maritime Forces’ Operations Center said last week that “the Houthis’ actions towards the entities they have sanctioned will determine the stability of the ceasefire agreement between them and the US.”

Optimism and other considerations:

Despite the uncertainty, the announcement of the ceasefire in Gaza was not devoid of positive indicators for navigation movement. The increased expectations of lower shipping prices and the easing of the Red Sea crisis led to a decline in the shares of many large shipping companies that take the Cape of Good Hope route, such as “Maersk” and the Israeli “ZIM,” whose stock fell by more than 10% within just one week.

Just as the ceasefire last January led to the return of many ships to the Red Sea, it is expected to be repeated now, as not all companies bind themselves to the standards adopted by companies like “Maersk.”

This also highlights other considerations that overlap with the state of “uncertainty.” Large companies like “Maersk” also fear that a rapid return to the Red Sea will lead to congestion and a rapid drop in shipping prices and significant profit losses. Furthermore, the process of rearranging the flow of operations and transport lines requires time and costs, and this favors the option of “waiting.”

In this context as well, sources in the marine insurance sector mentioned that insurance companies have not reduced war risk premiums for ships transiting the Yemeni operations area after the announcement of the agreement because these companies “want to compensate for the losses” they incurred due to compensation for the severe damages suffered by many targeted ships over the past two years, in addition to waiting for the ceasefire to hold.

However, these sources expected that Greek oil tankers might start returning as tensions decrease.