Ongoing Israeli threats to Yemen… context, objectives, and signs of confusion
Derar Al-Tayeb – Al-Khabar Al-Yemeni:
Far from the deterrence that remained impossible for the Zionist enemy and its partners throughout the period of confrontation with the Yemeni support front for Gaza, the enemy has not even been able to inflict enough impactful “damage” on this front to achieve the goal of exacting the “heavy price” that was set as an alternative to the goal of deterrence. Therefore, Israeli threats against Yemen continued after the ceasefire in Gaza, with a clear emphasis on cementing the idea that the confrontation has a sequel. Through this, the enemy seeks to achieve several objectives, but without success in hiding the fact of the limited options it possesses and the inability to guarantee the outcomes of this confrontation or control its course.
The latest threats came from Netanyahu himself, who said in a government meeting that he would do everything in his power to remove the “Houthi threat” because “it is not just a minor nuisance but a very major threat from an extremely fanatical movement, possessing the independent capability to produce its ballistic missiles and other weapons, and committed to a plan to destroy Israel, and this is not theoretical but something that can evolve over time,” in his words.
Netanyahu was speaking about the rest of the parties of the Resistance Axis as being—according to his overall claims—those whose degree had been greatly reduced, but his talk about Yemen presented a different vision, about a threat that was underestimated and has grown beyond expectations. Netanyahu was remarkably keen that “the Israeli public opinion pay attention” to the aspect of the danger of the Yemeni threat, which is somewhat unusual for the Israeli leadership, obsessed with manufacturing “images of victory” even if only through statements, especially against a front whose downplaying was a main strategy over the past two years, to an extent that annoyed Israeli public opinion, as there were many treatments and comments warning of the danger of downplaying the level of the Yemeni threat.
Anyway, the Israeli public opinion has already “paid attention,” and the Israeli researcher Or Lavi wrote in a comment on Netanyahu’s statements that “the Houthis possess latent capabilities that will transform them from a worrying nuisance into a strategic threat,” which has been said repeatedly during the war.
Thus, Netanyahu’s statement represented a “belated admission” of what had been said clearly in Israel for two years, but it is an intentional admission meant to appear as a first step towards solving the problem. Netanyahu doesn’t just want to “scare” the Israelis that there is an existential-level threat from Yemen; he wants this reality to be the background for the headline of doing “everything possible” to remove this threat and prepare for it on all levels. While it might be said that this supports Netanyahu’s political reliance on the idea of the necessity to continue the war to escape internal problems, this is merely a detail, because there are indeed many indicators of Israeli preparations to deal with the Yemen front.
Netanyahu’s threat to do everything necessary to “remove” the Yemeni threat was not without context. A few days earlier, the enemy’s Defense Minister, Yisrael Katz, stated that “the matter is not over with the Houthis,” repeating his threats during the war that Yemen “will pay a heavy price.” This came after similar statements by Finance Minister Smotrich, which also included an admission that “the Houthis have a massive underground infrastructure, and this is a major threat that must be eliminated.” These threats came to explain what Israeli security sources had earlier described as a “maturing Israeli desire to separate the Yemen and Gaza arenas” and continue attacks on Yemen, even if the ceasefire in Gaza continues.
These statements have internal and external objectives. On one hand, they try to deal with the Israelis’ realization of the reality of the abject failure to put an end to the escalating Yemeni threat despite the American campaigns and repeated Israeli bombing rounds against Yemen, especially in light of the reality of the continued closure of Eilat Port and the total, declared inability to restore its activity after the ceasefire, as the enemy leadership wants to say that the matter is not forgotten, but without promises of “deterrence.” The admission of Sana’a’s ability to produce weapons independently and possess large infrastructure, contrary to the propaganda of “smuggling” and “Iranian support” relied upon for years, lowers the ceiling on the possibility of decisively and quickly ending the confrontation with Sana’a, but it reintroduces the ceiling of collecting a “price” in a manner hoped to be better than what the Israeli raids and failed American campaigns provided.
Externally, there is no doubt that the Israeli threats aim to create what is called a “sense of pursuit” among the leaders of the Yemeni front in order to restrict their movement, pressure their activity, and isolate them, even with the continuation of the ceasefire in Gaza, assuming they are not prepared for such a situation. It is self-evident that the enemy’s threats also try to test the reaction of the Yemeni leadership and public to explore what might help predict movements, policies, and positions.
These threats likely also carry messages directed at the same time to other parties, such as the Gulf states and their local proxies in Yemen, especially since the plan to recruit these states and proxies still tops the list of ideas and proposals for dealing with the Yemeni front being discussed within the enemy entity. These are the same ideas and proposals that have warned throughout the past period of the danger of underestimating the Yemeni threat.
Among the things that made the Gulf states hesitate to participate fully in the American and Israeli escalation against Yemen was the fear of being left alone halfway. The minister of defense for the militias loyal to Saudi Arabia, Mohsen Al-Daari, said during his meeting with an Israeli team in Aden that the ceasefire between Sana’a and the US in May would have left the militias in a difficult position had they moved on the ground within the American escalation. Therefore, showing Israel’s continued interest in “removing the Yemeni threat” might be viewed by the Gulf states and their proxies as an incentive to move within the new escalation.
On the other hand, the Israeli threats reinforce the declared position of the Yemeni leadership, which is full readiness, maximum vigilance, and continued preparation for the next round. This is an objective that cannot be said Israel wants for those whom Israel is supposedly trying to “mislead.” However, the enemy leadership might think that there is no sacrifice of the element of “surprise” here, considering that Sana’a is already in a state of alert and preparedness, and there might be an assessment that the threats hinder Sana’a’s preparations by trying to keep the Yemenis under continuous security pressure.
But what some of Sana’a’s opponents reluctantly admit is that the ongoing Zionist threats undermine the narrative they and Israel are trying to cement, which claims that Sana’a is seeking unjustified conflicts and that the confrontation with Israel is merely a political slogan—a narrative that is supposed to aid mobilization efforts to rally local militias for the upcoming escalation.
In the end, the clear truth remains that Israel does not control the scene of preparation for the next round as it wants to show. Its threats, as much as they reflect a great keenness to target Yemen and remove the threat it poses, also reflect clear confusion and an inability to find a guaranteed and executable deterrence plan. The declared ceiling it seeks to raise high is to force Yemen to pay a “heavy price.”
(Meaning: liquidating most of the leadership and damaging Yemen’s military capabilities and economy enough to force Sana’a into a bilateral ceasefire while maintaining freedom of action for Israel)—relies on the idea of launching a wide and sustained campaign, something in which the US, which had a greater operational space and capabilities, has failed. This is while considering that the Yemeni reaction may hold new surprises that deepen the enemy’s predicament and that it is foolish to ignore the many differences between Yemen and other arenas.
As for the path of opening a regional, local, and international front against Yemen, it is a risk whose course and results cannot be controlled, no matter the preparations. However great the level of damage this front can cause, the repercussions of the confrontation will be wider than can be contained by merely ceasing fire or avoiding it by involving other parties, and not waging a fateful battle inside and outside the borders is not entirely strange to the Yemenis, nor is it a scenario where one can be satisfied with some of its results and bear the others… It is merely an adventure, not a plan.
In summary: The Israeli threats, so far, only add new admissions that two American campaigns with British participation, the presence of a European defensive coalition and regional support, and repeated rounds of Israeli bombing have failed not only to deter Yemen but also to put an end to the escalation of its strategic threat to the enemy entity—a reality too heavy to be balanced by a statement of “we will do everything in our power,” despite the variety of possibilities this phrase carries.